Morocco’s PJD is trying to rebuild after a sharp electoral defeat. The Justice and Development Party rose to prominence after the 2011 reform movement, governed for a decade, and then fell from 125 parliamentary seats to just 13 in 2021. Its return under former leader Abdelilah Benkirane raises a central question: can a familiar political figure restore public trust, or must the party change more deeply?
From post-2011 success to electoral collapse
The PJD benefited from the political reforms that followed protests in Morocco in 2011. Those protests called for stronger accountability, political reform and a government that responded more effectively to citizens.
Constitutional changes that year increased the formal role of Parliament and the government, although the monarchy retained major powers. The king appoints the head of government from the party that comes first in the House of Representatives. He also chairs the Council of Ministers, where strategic state policy orientations are considered.
The PJD won 107 of the 395 parliamentary seats in the November 2011 election. Its leader, Abdelilah Benkirane, became head of government.
Five years later, the party increased its total to 125 seats. Yet the result did not translate smoothly into continued leadership. Benkirane spent months trying to form a governing coalition. In March 2017, King Mohammed VI ended his mandate and appointed Saadeddine Othmani in his place.
The PJD remained in government until the 2021 election, when its support collapsed.
| Election year | PJD seats | Political significance |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 107 | The party emerged as the main beneficiary of the post-protest reforms |
| 2016 | 125 | The PJD strengthened its position but struggled to form a coalition |
| 2021 | 13 | The party suffered a dramatic defeat and lost its governing role |
The PJD lost 112 seats between 2016 and 2021. The National Rally of Independents won 102 seats and became the largest party.
That result raised questions about whether the PJD’s decade in power had weakened its connection with voters, exposed limits in its governing strategy, or damaged its claim to represent political reform.
What the PJD may have learned
The available material does not provide a detailed programme of internal reform or a full account of the party’s current organisation. Any assessment of what the PJD has “learned” must therefore be cautious. Its experience nevertheless points to several political lessons.
Electoral legitimacy must be renewed
The PJD’s early success was closely linked to the political atmosphere after 2011. Its role as a party with an Islamic reference and its image as a force for cleaner, more responsive government helped distinguish it from established political actors.
That advantage could not be assumed indefinitely. Once the party had governed for years, voters were likely to judge it not only by its identity but also by its record, alliances and ability to deliver.
The 2021 result suggests that an opposition or reformist image does not automatically survive a long period in office. A party that enters government as a vehicle for change eventually becomes responsible for explaining difficult decisions and unmet expectations.
Coalition politics cannot be treated as a technical afterthought
The PJD’s experience in 2016 showed how electoral success can be undermined by difficulties in forming a government. Benkirane’s prolonged inability to assemble a coalition preceded his removal as head of government.
In Morocco’s political system, winning the largest number of seats is necessary for the king to appoint a head of government from that party, but it does not guarantee effective control of the executive. A governing party must still negotiate with other parties and operate within a system in which the monarchy retains substantial authority.
For the PJD, the lesson is practical: electoral strength needs to be matched by coalition discipline and a workable governing strategy. Without those, a party can win an election yet struggle to turn that victory into visible political results.
Political responsibility must be explained, not merely claimed
The PJD’s position was shaped by a tension common to parties operating in systems where power is shared. It held government responsibility but did not control every centre of decision-making.
That can create a difficult public message. A party may argue that it lacks authority over some outcomes, while voters judge it as part of the governing establishment. If the explanation is not clear, responsibility can become politically one-sided: the party receives blame for government performance without receiving credit for its constraints.
The PJD’s future credibility will depend partly on whether it can explain this record without sounding evasive. Blaming institutions, coalition partners or circumstances may satisfy loyal supporters, but it is less likely to persuade voters who want a direct account of what the party did, what it could not do and what it would do differently.
Benkirane’s return: asset and risk
Abdelilah Benkirane remains one of Morocco’s best-known political figures. His public profile, long career and direct style have created what a recent Al Jazeera Studies analysis describes as a political “brand”. That personal recognition may give the PJD an immediate advantage as it tries to recover.
A well-known leader can provide:
- A clear public identity after an electoral defeat
- A strong link to the party’s earlier period of success
- A direct channel to voters and supporters
- Greater media visibility than a less established figure
For a party rebuilding from 13 seats, those assets matter. Benkirane can help the PJD regain attention and mobilise voters who remember its earlier role in government.
But reliance on one leader also carries risks.
The danger of becoming a personality-led party
If the PJD’s recovery rests too heavily on Benkirane, the party may struggle to demonstrate that it has renewed its ideas, organisation and leadership beyond him.
A personal political brand can attract attention, but it cannot by itself answer questions about:
- Why the party lost so heavily in 2021
- Whether its governing record has been honestly reviewed
- How it would manage future coalitions
- What policies it would pursue if returned to government
- Whether younger or new figures have a meaningful role
Benkirane’s visibility may be useful electoral capital, but it should not be confused with proof of a broader recovery. Recognition is not the same as renewed trust.
The central test will be whether the party uses his return to rebuild a durable organisation or simply to recreate an earlier political formula.
Can the PJD regain public trust?
The source material does not establish that the PJD has already regained support, nor does it provide evidence that Benkirane’s return has translated into electoral gains. The party’s prospects therefore remain uncertain.
A credible recovery would require more than criticism of the parties that followed it into government. It would likely involve a frank explanation of the 2021 defeat and a clear account of how the party has changed since then.
Voters may look for four forms of evidence:
-
A review of the governing decade
The party would need to explain both its achievements and its failures, rather than presenting the period only as a story of institutional obstruction. -
A clearer governing offer
A party seeking office must show what it would do, how it would pay for or implement its priorities, and how it would work with coalition partners. -
Leadership renewal
Benkirane may be central to the party’s visibility, but a sustainable comeback would require credible figures beyond its former head of government. -
A renewed connection with voters
The PJD would need to show that it understands the concerns of citizens who rejected it in 2021, including those who may no longer identify with its earlier reformist image.
The limits of a comeback built on nostalgia
The PJD’s past gives it a recognisable political story: it entered government after the 2011 protests, expanded its parliamentary presence in 2016 and remained in office for a decade. Benkirane’s leadership is strongly associated with that period.
Yet nostalgia can cut both ways. It may energise existing supporters, while reminding other voters of the problems associated with the party’s time in government. A return to earlier language or personalities will not necessarily recreate the conditions that produced the PJD’s original success.
The political environment has changed since 2011. The party is no longer benefiting from the same position as the principal vehicle for post-protest reform. It must now persuade voters that it has learned from governing, not simply that it deserves another chance.
What would count as a genuine recovery?
A genuine PJD recovery should be measured by more than media attention or the continued popularity of Benkirane. Useful indicators would include:
- Whether the party develops a visible second line of leadership
- Whether it publishes a coherent explanation of its 2021 defeat
- Whether it presents policies distinct from its previous governing record
- Whether it can build alliances without losing its political identity
- Whether voters who abandoned it begin to return
- Whether its public support extends beyond its established base
At present, the available information shows a party attempting to rebuild around a highly recognisable former leader. It does not demonstrate that the PJD has solved the organisational and political problems behind its collapse.
The broader lesson for Moroccan politics
The PJD’s rise and fall illustrates the limits of electoral success in a system where political authority is distributed between elected institutions and the monarchy.
The 2011 reforms gave Parliament and the government a larger formal role, but they did not remove the king’s major institutional powers. A party in government must therefore balance public demands, coalition bargaining and the boundaries of the constitutional system.
For the PJD, that balance became politically difficult. It gained the benefits of governing but also absorbed responsibility for outcomes shaped by a wider structure. Its defeat shows that voters may punish a governing party even when that party does not control every major decision.
The party’s future will depend on whether it can turn that experience into a credible new political offer. Benkirane can help reopen the conversation. He cannot, on his own, prove that the PJD has changed.
Sources
- Al Jazeera, “Morocco’s PJD: what has the party learned from its dramatic fall,” 20 September 2026: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/20/moroccos-pjd-what-has-the-party-learned-from-its-dramatic-fall?traffic_source=rss
Meta: Morocco’s PJD is rebuilding after its 2021 collapse. Explore Benkirane’s role, the party’s lessons and its uncertain path back to public trust.
